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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DO-CGLAS L. ROBINSON and 
NELDA H. ROBINSON, 
Plni1diffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
PAT"L SINGLETON HREINSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 10337 
S'rATEMENri1 OF THE KIND OF CASE 
'rhe Plaintiff hrought this action to recover damage~ 
for personal injuries to Plaintiff Nelda Robinson, and 
pro1wrty damage and loss of consortium to Plaintiff 
Douglas L. Robinson, arising out of an automobile acci-
dent occurring on Decemlwr 7, 19G3, on U.S. Highway 91, 
Plt>asant Grove, Utah. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LUWER COUR'l' 
The case was tried on the question of damages only, 
inasmuch as the Ddendant admitted liability, and J udg-
ment on the jury verdict was rendered in favor of the 
Plaintiffs as follows: 
Douglas L. Robinson 
Automobile Damages --------------------------------$ 258.00 
General Damages for 
loss of consortium -------------------------------- 7-1-2.00 
Total ------------------------------------------------------------$ 1,000.00 
Nelda H. Ro bins on 
Special Damages ----------------------------------------$ 1,217.4:-! 
General Damages -------------------------------------- 10,000.00 
Cost of household help ---------------------------- 679.50 
Total ------------------------------------------------------------$11,896.9-! 
Def endant filed and argued a Motion for New Trial 
which was denied and this Appeal was then taken. 
STATEMEN'r OF FACTS 
The facts of the accident are immaterial and are not, 
therefore, reviewed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant "leeks reversal of the Judgment, and a 
new trial. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE PLAINTIFF'S INTERJECTION OF "INSURANCE" 
BEFORE THE JURY, RESULTED IN AN UNFAIR TRIAL 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The Plaintiff Nelda H. Robinson testified, on direct 
examination by ht>r Attorm'y, <.'.Oncerning several persons 
who had assisted her with household help for several 
months following the accident and during the said testi-
mony ( T-89, 90) she testified as follows : 
"Q. Now, after .Mrs. Hoops left, did you hire 
someone additonal? 
"A. vVell, we really didn't hire my sister-
in-law, but she had quit her job at the time and 
was coming down about three times a week and 
helping us out, and she is still doing this. This is 
Joanne Robinson. And I told her that I would be 
glad to pay her, and she said that if ·we got enough 
and it would be - if the insurance would pay for 
her ·wages, then she would accept payment. If not 
she \Vouldn't, because she was my sister-in-law 
and she wouldn't expect money." 
A review of the "Gtah Supreme Court cases leaves 
no doubt that whether or not the Defendant was insured 
is i111111aforial and prejudicial. 
In 1932 the case of Balle -vs- V. S. Smith, 81 Utah 
179, 17 P 2d 22-±, the Court stated: 
''Comts have guarded jealously against the 
introduction of such evidence before the jury, not 
only because it is irrelevant to the issue, but be-
3 
cause jurors are commonly thought to be preju-
diced against insurance companies, and if the fact 
were known that the Defendant is insured, jurors 
would be less inclined to consider the case on the 
merits, and more inclined to render a verdict for 
Plaintiff and in a larger amount than if the De-
fendant ..... had to bear the loss alone." 
In Saltas -vs- Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P 2d 176, at 
179 this Court, in discussing the problem stated: 
" ... the Plaintiff's 1Counsel, knowing human 
nature and sympathies, leaning to relief when no 
direct imposition of punishment or hurt may be 
the direct result, is keen to get before the jury 
such information as will enhance the amount of 
the verdict. A suggestion that insurance exists is 
thought to furnish a motive or a temptation to 
trespass. Neither this Court nor the Trial Court is 
concerned about the question as to whether a De-
fendant carries insurance. Nor should the jury be 
so concerned. The cases indicate that this question, 
which should not be and is not a matter of concern, 
is often interjected in indirect ways upon this 
matter of insurance, giving rise to many cases." 
In Gittcn -vs- Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 28± P 2d 1115 
(1955) this Court again holding that the Defendant's in-
surance is immaterial, states : 
"Generally speaking, reference to ( insuranc2) 
for the purpose of getting it before the Jury is 
prejudicial. An exception to this is where a refer-
ence to insurance is so inter1voven in an admission 
against interest that it is impractical to exclude it 
without destroying or impairing the benefit of 
the admission, to which the Plaintiff is entitled." 
4 
In Reid-'cs- Owells, 98 Utah 50, 93 P :2d 680 at 685 the 
Court states: 
" . ~We would be closing our eyes to a fact 
1\·ell known to Trial Courts and Trial Lawyers 
were we to assert that the probability of any jury 
being influenced in determining the question of 
liability and the question of the amount of recov-
ery by the fact that the insurance company would 
pay the damages assessed, is so remote as not to 
challenge judicial notices." 
In the more recent case ( 1959) of I vie -vs- Richard-
son, 9 Utah :2nd 3, 336 P :2nd 781, this Court, noting that 
the jury's verdict was $5,000.00 stated: 
"'11his, it is commonly known, is the limit of 
one type of insurance policy for personal injuries 
to one's pernon." 
lt will be noted in the case at bar, that the general 
verdict of $10,000.00 for the Plaintiff is the same basic 
re4uirement of the lJtah Financial Responsibility Act 
(H-12-5 U.C.A., as amended), a fact commonly known 
by residents of Utah, and therefore juries. 
l\Irs. Robinson, while being questioned by her own 
Attorney, and in response to a question which had noth-
ing to do with insurance, voluntarily, and we think pur-
posely, made it clear to the jury that her sister-in-law 
intended to Le paid if the Plaintiff received a high enough 
Judgment, or if the Defendant's insurance company 
settl<•d the case and included that cost in the settlement. 
Her answer left no doubt whatsoever but that that 
was the clear and unmistakable arrangement she had with 
her sister-in-law. 
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It will be noted that the Defendant, immediat<:'ly, in-
dicated to the Court that it had a l\I otion, and outside the 
presence of the jury, moved for a mistrial which was de-
nied. Thereafter the trial proceeded with not even an ad-
monition to the jury. 
The Court indicated by his remarks that the Plain-
tiff had not indicated whPther she \Yas speaking of her 
insurance or the Defe11da11t's insurance. (T90) Apparent-
ly, the Court saw nothing erroneous in allowing the jury 
to conjecture in the jury room on whose insurance was 
meant, as from the state of the Record, the Plaintiff's 
statement was, as far as the jury was concerm•d, part 
of the evidence which they had every right to consider. 
If the Defendant actually had hopes that the above 
conjecture might fool the jury into believing Plaintiff 
meant her own insurance, he just wasn't thinking-as we 
always assume juries do. 
1. There is no insurance whatsoever that will 
pay Plaintiff's sister-in-law to help aroimd the 
hoiise-maybe Registered Nurses under a doctor's 
order, but not household help. CWe invite Respon-
dent to deny that that is true.) 
2. Plaintiff's alleged conversation with her 
sister-in-law took place about six months after the 
accident, and following several others who alleged-
ly helped. That would be ample time to find out 
what her own insurance covered. 
3. 8he was represented by eminently capable 
counsel who could advise her in a few minutes 
cursory reading of the policy that her policy (if 
any) did or did not cover her for that expense. 
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-±. Her prior testimony was that she had paid 
prior help out of her own pocket-a peculiar 
thing, if she had insurance coverage, or even a 
possibility of coverage. 
5. Her testimony was almost a year to the day 
follm,·ing tlH-' accident. ~Was the jury to still gue:>s 
that :>ht~ still hadn't found out her own insurance 
coverage~ 
H is a sirnpl<' solution to close our eyes and assume 
that the jury is composed of eight naive, uninformed and 
somewhat hlasP individuals, or that the remark, perhaps 
was not heard, maybe having been drmvned out by the 
Christmas carols "·hich were heing played in the foyer of 
the Court House during the Plaintiff's testimony. 
'To consider the problem based upon the above, or 
some other assumption, is to "close our eyes" to reality. 
\Vhen the Plaintiff unexpectedly, and without fore-
warning to Defendant's Attorney, blurts out "insurance", 
tlw Defendant in this and every law suit is placed in an 
untenable position, for the following reasons: 
1. An imrnNliatt• objection and a motion to strike, 
made in the presencP of a jury, emphasizes the fact 
that the De fondant is insured; else no objection or motion 
would be made in the first place. 
:L To allow the interjection of insurance to pass 
without objection, in the vain hope that the jury was 
aslee1i, would waive the Defendant's rights. (Hill -1JS-
Clo1rnrd, 1-t Utah 2nd 55, 377 P 2nd 186.) 
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3. After the motion for mistrial has been denied, the 
Defendant's hands are completely tied, inasmuch as he 
cannot cross-examine the Plaintiff on the question of 
insurance in order to determine from her inunediately 
which insurance she \Yas ref erring to, as by the very ques-
tion he would be waiving his objection to the ans\ver, 
(which Defendant already knows) and at the same time 
the harm that had already been done would be aggra-
vated, if that is possible. 
4. The Defendant, certain that the interjection of 
insurance has prejudiced the jury, is forbidden to place 
in evidence such facts as the low limits of his policy; or 
the fact, perhaps, that the insurance company is defend-
ing under a reservation of rights and may not, after all, 
pay a judgment; or, if it be the case, that he really is not 
insured at all. 
5. The Defendant dare not ask the Court to admonish 
the jury "Forget that the Plaintiff said 'insurance' ", or 
words to that effect. This writer is of the unchangeable 
belief that as soon as the Court pinpoints a remark to the 
jury, he brings it into high focus, and his admonition to 
the jury, to then forget it, make it that much more impos-
sible for them to comply with the admonition. The De-
fendant, therefore, in order not to again aggravate, dwell 
upon or enlarge the wound caused by the Plaintiff's 
thrust, has only one recourse and that is to suf for in 
silence. 
Whether the Plaintiff's remarks concernmg insur-
ance, in the presence of the jury, was purposeful or un-
8 
intentional, should have no bearing on the obvious fact 
that it was still highly prejudicial to the Defendant. 
In ± ALR 2d 816 there is an Annotation in which 
some Courts seem to feel that an inadvertent remark by 
the Plaintiff, innocently made, seems to make some dif-
ference to the Defendant, even though it is an obvious 
fact that the jury nevertheless, was prejudiced. 
In the first place, it is impossible to conceive how 
any Supreme Court can determine long after the trial, 
whether the remark was "innocent" or designedly made 
with malice aforethought, without pure, unadulterated 
conjecture in the wildest form, and without ever having 
even seen the Plaintiff in person. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in an excellently rea-
soned opinion, has faced the problem squarely. 
In Pratt -vs- Womack 359 P 2d, (1961), wherein the 
Plaintiff's husband, ·while testifying under direct examin-
ation by Plaintiff's Attorney, made the statement "I was 
very sure that they carried compensation". 
Defendant's Attorney immediately moved for a mis-
trial, which was denied, and the Trial Court admonished 
the Jury not to give the remark any consideration. 
Inasmuch as the language of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court squarely sets out the Appellant's position herein, 
we quote at length from it, at Page 225: 
"The Courts admonition does not cure the 
prejudice." Dolliver -vs- Lathrom, 183 Okl. 329, 
82 P. 2d 675. 
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In Rrdman -i;s- McDaniel, Old., 333 P 2d 500, 
we held that irn-' judicP results as a matter of law 
when it is madt> to appear that Defendant is cov-
ered by liability insurance. 
At Page 503 of the opinion, we said: In some 
of our former decisions where Plaintiffs informed 
the jury that Defrnclants were prntected by in-
suranee, vn' refused to reverse the Trial Court be-
cause we could not say that a new trial would re-
sult in a diffe1·ent finding, or result in a smaller 
verdict. Stated another ·way, ·we refuse to reverse 
because we were unable to say that the improper 
conduct had any prejudical influence upon the 
Jury. 
These decisions are not realistic. They are in 
conflict ·with the view that prejudice results when 
the jury knows that an insurance company 'Nill 
have to pay the .J udgrnent. It permits the Plaintiff 
to deliberately inject heneficial prejudice into the 
case, ·which experience permits a Plaintiff to re-
tain that larger recovery for the simple reason 
that it is difficult ,if not impossible, for this Court 
to segregate and identify the harm done. This type 
of decision encourages improper conductr ( empha-
sis added) 
Since l\'e are of the view that knowledge of in-
surance coverage will cause a jury to render a 
larger verdict and in some cases render a verdict 
in favor of Plaintiff when otherwise it would not, 
it becomes the duty of this Court to compensate 
for the harm done hy appropriate action. In some 
cases this may be done by directing a remittitur. 
In other cases it may be necessary to grant a new 
trial." 
In the case at uar, the jury took to the jury room, as 
evidence, the fact that the Defendant was insured. They 
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had not even been admonished by the Court, or instructed, 
that the evidence concerning insurance was i1mnaterial. 
"Having been objected to and having been 
rnl!:'d in, the ;jury were given to understand that 
they WPre to use it for some purpose. The fact 
that the incornpPtent testimony is laid before the 
jury undPr favorable rulings by the Court ... 
tends to increase ratlH'l' than diminish its preju-
dicial effect." Bojas -vs- Viwcolo, 142 Tex. 152, 
177 8.\V. 2d 9G2 cited in City of New Cordell -vs-
Lou·c, Okl., 389 P. 2d 103 (1963). 
If we are concerned with whether the Defendant had 
a fair trial, and we are "realistic," as suggested by the 
Oklahoma 8uprerne Court, and keep our "eyes open," as 
suggested by this Court, then Plaintiff's voluntary in-
terjection of Defendant's insurance before the jury, ob-
viously prejudiced the jury, 'vith the only conclusion that 
the trial was not fair. 
How the Plaintiff prejudiced the jury, whether with 
a secret design or an inadvertent remark which only 
Plaintiff herself knows, seems imrnate1·ial. 
\Ve believe that to condone an unfair trial to this 
Defendant, on the grounds of a wild assumption that the 
Plaintiff's remark was "innocent," will open the doors 
very wide to future unscrupulous Plaintiffs. If these 
future Plaintiffs are poor actors, practice will help, and 
if they are semi-accomplished actors, the "inadvertent" 
dropping of the word "insurance" will be a cinch. They 
need only keep an innoeent, surprised expression going 
while the Defendant's Attorney writhes and fumes, and 
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l:HHiletlill~S lets out strange noises. rl'he actor should not 
say "Defendant's insuranee" - and he need not. Any 
immediate action by Defendant's Counsel will take all 
doubt out of the jury's mind. And if the Defondant's 
Attorney just sits ther,•, sallow-complexioned and :-;tun-
ned, then the act has \rnrh•d wonderfull>', and the certain 
larger verdict gatlwrs 8% interest, while untenable ob-
jections are made to the Supreme Court, because Defen-
dant's Attorney has waived his objections by silence. 
On whose shoulders should the risk of such an im-
proper remark lief Certainly not the Defondant. 
Furthermore, it is not an answer to this appeal that 
the Judgment rendered was reasonable in light with sub-
jective complaints claimed by the Plaintiff, and the testi-
mony of her doctor. 
The real unfairn('8S of the trial is found in the prob-
ability that tlw ;jury, knowing that the Defendant was in-
sured, and as8llming that the verdict for the Plaintiff 
would not "hurt" the insurance company, were thereby 
led away from giving proper and adequate consideration 
to the medical testimony produced by the Defendant, 
which showed that there was nothing wrong with the 
Plaintiff. It wa8 tlw contention of the Defendant, and 
amply supported by evidence, that the Plaintiff was onl;-· 
injured to a minor extent. Had "in8llrnnce" not been in-
terjected and the jury unprejudiced, the jury wrdict, 
despite the admission of liahilit;--, reasonably could have 
been expected to be nominal in comparison with the ver-
dict rendered. 
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For these n•asorn.;, Defendant is entitled to a rever-
sal, and a fair trial. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
SPECULATIVE TESTIMONY OF DR. WAYNE M. HEBERT-
SON AS TO THE FUTURE MEDICAL TREATMENT THE 
PLAINTIFF MAY REQUIRE AND INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT THEY COULD CONSIDER THE NEED FOR 
FUTURE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN MAKING AN AWARD. 
At the trial, the Plaintiff called Dr. \Vayne M. He-
berb;on, a neurologist ( T-5±). Dr. Hebertson testified 
that he examined Mrs. Robinson and gave her several 
neurological tests ( T-55, 5G). As a result of his examina-
tion, he diagnosed Plaintiff as having suffered severe 
strain of the neck and spine and radiculitis of the nerve 
roots of the neck ( T-57). He also originally felt that the 
Plaintiff may have sustained a herniated disc in the neck 
area (T-57). The x-ray examination of the Plaintiff did 
not show any abnormal condition of the vertebrae of the 
Plaintiff's spine (T-61). Dr. Hebertson stated that the 
Plaintiff's complaints were all subjective (T-73), and 
his diagnosis was dependent upon the symptoms and 
history supplied by the Plaintiff (T-69-72). 
Over the Appellant's objection, Plaintiff's Counsel 
was allowed to elicit from Dr. Herbertson his opinion as 
to tlw need for future surgical treatment. Dr. Herbertson 
stated that the Plaintiff could probably get along in her 
pres(mt condition without surgical treatment but for her 
condition to improve, she may need surgery (T-63). Dr. 
Heberh;on indicated that if surgery was to be done in 
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the future, it would probably involve a two step operation 
with a spinal fm;ion being done in the lumbar region and 
a cervical disc extraction and interbody fusion in the 
neck area (T-6-1, G5). Dr. H<>bertson indicated that wheth-
er an operation would be necessary 1rnuld depend upon 
whether the Plaintiff improved within the next six month 
period (T-70) and frlt that an observation period of be-
tween twelve and eighteen months would be necessary 
before he would definitely recommend surgery ( rr-70). 
If the Plaintiff's condition improved, there 1rnuld be no 
necessity for surgery (T-71). Dr. Hebertson had per-
formed a myelogram on the Plaintiff which was negative 
(T-71). 
It is submitted that the testimony of Dr. Hebertson 
as to the need of the Plaintiff to undergo surgery 1rns 
speculative and anticipatory and not proper for the jury 
to consider. That testimony when considered with the 
fact that the trial court instructed the jury that they could 
consider the nt'ed for future medical attention in making 
their award constituted error. 
It is well established that before a Plaintiff may 
recover for future medical expenses or future medical 
treatment, the likelihood of the treatment must appear 
with reasonable certainty. Sm1g -vs- City of St. Loitis, 
262 Mo. 45-1, 171 f:'-\\T. 3-17 (191-1); McCormick, Damages, 
p. 32-1. The jury will not be allo1Yed to speculate as to 
the possibility of future treatment. In 69 A.L.R 2d 1261, 
1263, it is stated: 
''Bpfore an allowanct• for the cost of future 
medieal ean• ean lw made, there must, of course, 
14 
be evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
any such care will be necessitated by the injury 
forming the basis of the action." 
ln Carracu Oil Cu. -V::;- Morhain, 380 P. 2d 957 (Okla. 
1963), the Oklahoma Court reversed an award for the 
Plaintiff in an automobile accident on the grounds that 
the Court erred in giving an instruction allowing the jury 
to consder the likelihood of a future operation. The 
physician who testified said he could not be certain as to 
the prognosis since he did not know how long the injured 
Plaintiff would continue to use his limb and what re-
covery could be expected. r:L'he Court held the instruction, 
although properly framed, was erroneous because of the 
speculative nature of the evidence. It observed: 
"There is no evidence in the record that Plain-
tiff will probably have further surgery. The 
testimony on this point is unsatisfactory and in-
conclusive, rendering speculative ·whether such an 
operation will probably be necessary to the pres-
ervation of Plaintiff's life or health. In the ab-
sence of any testimony that Plaintiff at some time 
in the future will probably have to undergo an 
operation on his hip, there is no legal basis for 
assessing against Defendants the cost of such an 
operation which may not occur.'' 
ln Condron -i;::;- Harl, 37± P. 2d 613 (Haw. 1962), the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed on the grounds that 
the Court erred in submitting the issue of a future oper-
ation to the jury where it appeared the Plaintiff was 
attempting to get along without surgery. r:l'he Court ob-
served: 
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''The testimony was to the effect that Plain-
tiff, on medical advice, ·was seeking to live \\'ith 
his disability, rather than to be operated upon. 
Surgery, it ·was testified, was an alternative to 
be considered 'at such time as he felt that living 
with it was too burdensome.' There was insuffi-
cient evidence to show ·with reasonable certainty 
that Plaintiff's condition would, in future, call 
for an operation. Accordingly it was error to 
submit to the jury the matter of an avvard for the 
expenses incident thereto (citing cases)." 
To the same effect are Fairley -vs- St. Louis Public 
Service Conipany, 362 S.vV. 2d 5±9 (Mo. 1962) and Madi-
son -vs- Southern Farm Bureait Casualty Ins. Co., 120 
So. 2d 3±2 (La. App.). 
Applying the facts of the instant case to the rnles 
and situations of the above cases, it is ap1mrent that the 
trial court committed reversible error. Dr. Hebertson's 
testimony was to the effect that Plaintiff's x-rays did 
not show any abnormal condition and that the Plaintiff's 
complaints \\'ere generally subjective. Dr. Hebertson's 
diagnosis was principally based upon the history and 
the subjective evidence offered by the Plaintiff. Dr. 
Hebertson indicated the Plaintiff could probably get by 
in her present condition, but that if she desired improve-
ment, surgery may be necessary, however he could not 
determine whether or not surgery would in fact be war-
ranted for a period of twelve to eighteen months. Under 
these circumstances, it is apparent that Dr. Hebertson's 
testimony was speculative as to the need of the Plain-
tiff for future surgery, and although speculative or re-
mote, evidence is a matter prineipally for the trial court's 
16 
consideration; Witkin, California Evidence, p. 135; Mc-
Connick, Evidence, p. 132. By allowing the jury to re-
ceive such speculative evidence and then give an instruc-
tion that future medical t>xpense and treatment could be 
considered in making an award, the jury was allowed 
to return a s1Jeculative verdict which was reversible er-
ror. The facts and evidence in the instant case are similar 
to those in the Co11dron (supra) case where the Hawaiian 
Supreme Court nott>d that whether or not an operation 
would take place l\'ould be dependent upon whether the 
Plaintiff at some futme time felt corrective surgery was 
necessary. A similar situation in the 111 orhain (supra) 
case, manifests that the evidence in the instant case and 
the accompanying instruction should not have been con-
sidered by the jury. In Moore -vs- D&RGWRR Co., 4 
Utah 2d 255, 292 Pac. 2d 849 (1956), this Court recog-
nized that in determining whether or not a Plaintiff was 
entitled to recover for an injury, the context of a medi-
cal testimony must be considered as a whole, and if it 
appears that the plaintiff's damages are mere possibili-
ties or speculative, the Plaintiff is not entitled to have 
the jury consider the issue. It is submitted that because 
the operation which the jury was allowed to consider in 
the instant case was tentative, speculative and uncertain, 
this Court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
415 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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